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Abstract 
Privacy preservation in RFID systems is a very important issue in modern day world. Privacy 
activists have been worried about the invasion of user privacy while using various RFID systems 
and services. Hence, significant efforts have been made to design RFID systems that preserve 
users' privacy. Majority of the privacy preserving protocols for RFID systems require the reader 
to search all tags in the system in order to identify a single RFID tag which not efficient for large 
scale systems. In order to achieve high-speed authentication in large-scale RFID systems, 
researchers propose tree-based approaches, in which any pair of tags share a number of key 
components. Another technique is to perform group-based authentication that improves the 
tradeoff between scalability and privacy by dividing the tags into a number of groups. This 
novel authentication scheme ensures privacy of the tags. However, the level of privacy 
provided by the scheme decreases as more and more tags are compromised. To address this 
issue, in this paper, we propose a group based anonymous private authentication protocol 
(AnonPri) that provides higher level of privacy than the above mentioned group based scheme 
and achieves better efficiency (in terms of providing privacy) than the approaches that prompt 
the reader to perform an exhaustive search. Our protocol guarantees that the adversary cannot 
link the tag responses even if she can learn the identifier of the tags. Our evaluation results 
demonstrates that the level of privacy provided by AnonPri is higher than that of the group 
based authentication technique. 
Keywords 
Anonymity, Authentication, Privacy, RFID, Security, Unlinkibility 
1. Introduction 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems are becoming the most possible successor of 
barcode and are starting to be used in many different applications. RFID systems have been 
studied actively and frequently in pervasive computing environments for during last decade. It 
is a latest technology that eases automated recognition and has emerged as a feasible solution 
for identifying large quantities of item. One of the major remuneration of such a system is that 
human intervention is eliminated and a large number of items can be identified within little 
time. Evaluating the benefits of RFID begins not only with a full understanding of how the 
technology works, but also an appreciation of how the implementation of the technology saves 
time, reduces handling and labor costs, cuts cycle times, eliminates errors, and improves overall 
quality. 
However, the expansion of RFID technology is limited because of security and privacy concerns. 
Conventional security primitives cannot be integrated in RFID tags as they have inadequate 
computation capabilities with extremely limited resources. Hence, before the enormous 
deployment of RFID tags in omnipresent environment, security and privacy issues must be 
addressed. The inherent capability of precise and reliable identification attracts RFID systems in 
the area of tracking applications. This potentiality, however, can put individual privacy at a risk. 
A threat to consumer privacy is one of the major obstacles in the widespread deployment of 
RFID systems. A field trial of RFID embedded loyalty cards in Europe was cancelled due to 
consumer protest over privacy concerns.5 Another legal law violation have been reported 
against RFID application tracking kids on school buses, even though the RFID chips were 
installed on the buses for better route navigation and communication purposes.27 The use of 
RFID chips in retail industry have been negatively reported and protested recently all over 
North America.28 Additionally, plenty of healthcare applications using RFID chips are always 
facing controversy form consumer and government due to potential privacy leakage of its 
users.29,12 Many RFID based tracking applications used in E-Passports, consumer shopping, 
smart keys, such everyday applications have gone through strong opposition from users, and 
policy makers since there are potential chances of privacy violation.12 Strong authentication can 
be a solution to such privacy problems. One party (prover) has to prove its own identity to 
another party (verifier) in such way that an adversary can neither identify nor track the party 
(prover). Here, the tag is the prover and the reader is the verifier. 
To address the privacy problem of RFID system, the tag has to obfuscate its identity from 
eavesdroppers in such a way that only the valid reader can understand and identify the tag. 
Encrypting the tag's message can protect its privacy. However, this technique cannot provide 
any hint to the reader about the key that the tag is using to encrypt its message. Therefore, the 
reader has to search among a set of candidate keys until it finds the right key that correctly 
decrypts the tag's message. As a result, the reader becomes inefficient in terms of identifying a 
single tag since it has to search a number of keys. This problem is intensified when the number 
of tags in the system increases. 
Several private authentication schemes proposed in16,26,36 provide strong privacy at the cost of 
the search complexity on the reader's side. In these protocols, the workload of the reader 
increases linearly with the number of tags in the system. In other words, the search complexity 
is O(N), where N is the total number of tags in the system. These approaches become infeasible 
in some applications, such as tracking each product at every stage of supply chain management 
or automated display of flight information on smart tickets, where there is a huge of number of 
tags in the system. 
Molnar and Wagner5 first proposed a tree based hash protocol for RFID systems to reduce the 
search complexity of the reader from O(N) to O(logαN), where α is the branching factor at each 
level of the tree. The tag has to always perform logαN encryptions for every authentication. 
However, for authenticating a single tag, the worst case complexity of the reader is reduced to 
αlogαN. But this approach achieves better scalability at the cost of some privacy loss of the 
tags.25 Despite the privacy loss, the RFID community has held this protocol in great 
consideration because this is the first private authentication protocol that reduces the 
complexity of the reader. Therefore, improving the tradeoff between scalability and privacy of 
RFID systems has a great significance in reality. In,4 the authors proposed a modified version of 
the tree based protocol where the branching factors are different at different levels of the tree. 
This approach improves the overall provided privacy. The authors also propose an algorithm to 
determine the optimal key tree for a given number of tags. Later, Avoine et al.3 proposed a 
group based private authentication scheme that improves the tradeoff between scalability and 
privacy by dividing the tags into a number of groups. A benefit of this approach is that the tag 
has to perform only two encryptions for every authentication. In addition, this approach 
provides significant improvement in privacy protection. A serious limitation of this protocol is 
that whenever any tag is compromised (the group key and the tag's key become known to the 
adversary), all other tags of the same group lose their complete privacy. The level of privacy 
provided by the scheme decreases as more and more tags are compromised. 
1.1. Summary of contributions 
Our major contributions in this paper are as follows:  
• In this paper, we provide a new insight on the privacy issue of RFID systems. We use an 
experiment-based definition to formalize RFID privacy from the perspective of 
unlinkability among different RFID tags. Our idea is to preserve privacy by introducing 
the notion that adversary cannot break unlinkability or invade privacy with probability 
better than random guessing. 
• We present a group based anonymous private authentication protocol (AnonPri) as a 
solution to the tradeoff between the scalability and privacy problem of RFID systems. 
AnonPri uses symmetric key encryption and provides higher level of privacy than the 
above mentioned group based scheme and achieves better efficiency (in terms of 
disclosing less information) than the approaches that prompt the reader to do 
exhaustive search. Note, our proposal AnonPri is also a group based authentication 
protocol as the one proposed by Avoine3 except it uses different techniques to provide 
better privacy and ensure more security in an RFID system. Hence, we compared the 
performance of AnonPri with the group based authentication protocol presented in.3 
• Based on the notion of RFID privacy, we prove that AnonPri protects privacy of RFID tags 
and thereby the privacy of tag holders. We also prove that AnonPri provides 
unlinkability and thereby preserves privacy. The adversary cannot link the tag 
responses, even if she can decrypt the first portion of the response and learn the 
identifier that the tags are using to produce the response. 
Note, we approach RFID privacy both from modeling and from protocol point of view. Our 
privacy model avoids the drawbacks of several proposed RFID privacy models that either suffer 
from insufficient generality or put forward unrealistic assumptions regarding the adversary's 
ability to corrupt tags. Furthermore, our model can guarantee unlikibility among tags. By 
privacy assurance, in our system, we refer to the notion that adversary is not able to identify 
which output was send by which tag. By unlinkibility, we refer to the notion that adversary is 
not able to distinguish between two tag outputs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews important privacy protection 
approaches proposed so far in RFID systems. In Section 3 we discuss the details of our system 
model. We present the AnonPri protocol in Section 4. The attack model is presented in 
Section 5. Subsequently, we present the privacy model in Section 6. In Section 7, we formally 
prove that our protocol preserves data privacy and provides unlinkability. In Section 8, we 
measure the level of privacy achieved by AnonPri as a function of the total number of 
compromised tags. In Section 9, we discuss the limitation of AnonPri. We present relevant 
related work in Section 10. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 11. 
2. Privacy in RFID systems 
2.1. Privacy vs. scalability 
Ensuring strong privacy imposes a higher complexity on the reader. On the other hand, 
improving efficiency may hamper some privacy. In this paper, we focus on this major problem 
between privacy and scalability problem of RFID systems. Public key cryptography would be a 
better candidate to solve the problem between privacy and scalability. In this approach, the tag 
would encrypt its message using the public key of the reader so that only the real reader would 
be able to decrypt the message and identify the tag. However, public key encryption is too 
expensive for low cost tags. Since we consider low cost tags that are capable of doing 
symmetric key encryption, our proposal is based on symmetric key encryption. In this section, 
first, we outline how the tree based hash protocol provides scalability but sacrifice some 
privacy. Next, we describe how the group based protocol provides improved scalability as well 
as a higher level of privacy. Finally, we point out the privacy problem of this group based 
protocol. 
Tree based hash protocol: The tree based hash protocol proposed by Molnar and Wagner20 
reduces the reader's complexity from O(N) to O(logαN). Tags are organized in a secret key tree 
where each tag is assigned to a leaf of the tree. Secret keys are associated with each branch of 
the tree. Each tag (each leaf) receives all the secret keys along the path from the root to itself. If 
the tree has L levels, each tag stores L keys. The authors20 proposed the key tree as a balanced 
tree. So if the branching factor is α, the logαN will be equal to L. Each tag has only one key that 
is not shared with any other tag of the system. Fig. 1 shows a balanced key tree with 𝑁𝑁 = 8 and 
𝛼𝛼 = 2. 
 
Fig. 1. A secret key tree for the tree based hash protocol with 𝑁𝑁 = 8 and 𝛼𝛼 = 2. 
According to this protocol, the reader queries a tag with a nonce nr. Upon the reception of the 
nonce from the reader, the tag generates another nonce nt and replies to the reader with  
𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ,ℎ(𝑘𝑘𝑙𝑙1 ∥ 𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟 ∥ 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡),ℎ(𝑘𝑘𝑙𝑙1,𝑙𝑙2 ∥ 𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟 ∥ 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡), … ,ℎ(𝑘𝑘𝑙𝑙1,𝑙𝑙2,…,𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿 ∥ 𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟 ∥ 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡), 
Where, each 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1, … ,𝛼𝛼} 1 ≤ i ≤ L, h(.) is a hash function and ∥ represents concatenation. The 
nonce produced by the tag provides unlinkability between two consecutive responses from the 
same tag. On the other side, the nonce from the reader prevents replay attacks. After receiving 
the response, the reader first finds a match with the first hash value of the response by hashing 
with all the keys of level 1. Whenever the reader obtains a match, the reader starts to search 
for the second hash value of the response by hashing with all the keys at the next level of the 
sub-tree rooted at the node where the reader has found the match. The reader repeats this 
step until it reaches a leaf. Thus, the reader's complexity is reduced to O(logαN). In worst case, 
the reader has to search with all keys at each level of the tree and therefore, the complexity 
becomes αlogαN. 
The major drawback of this approach is the loss of privacy if the adversary compromises any 
tag. Since the tags share keys with some of the tags in the system, whenever a single tag 
becomes compromised all the tags that share at least one key with the compromised tag have 
to sacrifice their privacy. Suppose the tag T3 in Fig. 1 becomes compromised. All the tags of the 
system are partitioned into three disjoint sets. The adversary can now uniquely distinguish the 
tag T4 and identify the tags T1 and T2 as a unique partition. All the remaining tags (T5, T6, T7, T8) 
form a single partition because the tag T3 shares no key with them. Therefore each tag of this 
partition (T5, T6, T7, T8) is anonymous among these four tags. The privacy provided by this 
scheme diminishes as more and more tags are compromised by the adversary. 
Group based protocol: Avoine et al.3 proposed a group based authentication protocol to 
address the privacy problem of the tree based hash protocol. According to this protocol, tags 
are divided into γ disjoint groups of equal size. Each group is associated with a unique key that 
we refer to as a group key. Every tag shares this group key with other members of the given 
group. Each tag is assigned a unique key that is known only to the tag and the reader. Fig. 2 
shows the group organization of the tags where 𝑁𝑁 = 8 and 𝛾𝛾 = 4. The ki’s are the group keys, 
where 1 ≤ i ≤ γ. The identifier of the jth tag is represented by IDj (not shown in Fig. 2) and the 
unique secret key of the same tag is denoted as 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗, where 1 ≤ j ≤ 8. 
 
Fig. 2. Group organization of the tags for the group based authentication protocol, with 𝑁𝑁 = 8 
and 𝛾𝛾 = 4. 
According to this protocol, the reader queries the tag with a nonce nr. The tag, then, replies the 
following encrypted message (we assume that each tag has the knowledge of the encryption 
algorithm) with the nonce nt produced by the tag 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖(𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟 ∥ 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ∥ 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗) ∥ 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗(𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟 ∥ 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡). 
Now the reader tries all the group keys to decrypt the first portion of the message. If the reader 
finds the right key that correctly decrypts the message, then the reader can learn IDj and 
decrypt the following portion of the response with the secret key of the tag Tj. Thus, the reader 
verifies the tag's legitimacy. This protocol reduces the complexity of both the reader and the 
tag. The tag always has to perform two encryptions. In the worst case, the reader has to 
perform 𝛾𝛾 + 1 encryptions. In addition, each tag needs to store only two keys for the 
authentication. 
The group organization of this protocol improves the level of privacy. If the adversary 
compromises any tag then this only effects the other members of its group. After compromising 
the tag, the adversary learns the group key and the tag's secret key. Now the adversary can 
uniquely identify every single tag from the same group since the adversary can discover each 
tag's identifier by decrypting the first portion of the response from each tag with the learned 
group key. All the remaining tags that belong to different groups form a single partition so the 
adversary cannot distinguish the tags that belong to this partition. For instance, if the tag T3 is 
compromised, the adversary can uniquely identify only the tag T4 (see Fig. 2). The adversary 
cannot uniquely distinguish the other tags T1, T2, T5, T6, T7, T8. Each of these tags remains 
anonymous among these six tags. This is a significant improvement in privacy protection of RFID 
systems in comparison with other protocols including tree based protocol. 
Like other protocols, this protocol also has some limitations. There is a tradeoff between the 
number of groups and the group size. To address this problem, we propose an efficient 
anonymous private authentication (AnonPri) scheme that improves the privacy protection by 
keeping the reader's complexity moderate. In our approach, each tag is assigned to a couple of 
unique identifiers. A single tag shares some of its identifiers with some members of its group. 
Hence, this protocol prevents tracking by increasing the uncertainty of the adversary. Please 
note, here the identifiers should not be confused with tag keys. Identifiers are like names or IDs 
for tags. Disclosure of the identifiers means loss of privacy. On the other hand, tag key or key is 
a unique key that follows cryptographic properties and is secretly shared between the tag and 
reader. Tag key is used for symmetric encryption between the tag and reader in our system. 
2.2. Privacy characterization 
In literature, several different notions of privacy have been proposed so far. Some authors 
mention information privacy as the privacy of RFID systems. This privacy notion is the act of 
preventing a tag from disclosing its product information.36,26 However, protecting information 
privacy keeps tags traceable. Therefore, it is a weak notion of RFID privacy. Some define 
unlinkability as the strong notion of RFID privacy.25,6 Unlinkability means the inability to 
distinguish between the responses from the same tag and the responses from different tags of 
the system. Providing unlinkability ensures strong privacy when the adversary cannot 
distinguish between two tags with a probability better than random guessing.16 In our protocol, 
we protect privacy of the tags by providing unlinkability between two tags of the system. 
The level of privacy obtained by any protocol can be measured using the anonymity set. 
Anonymity has been proposed in the context of mix-nets in.8 Mix-nets are used to make the 
sender (and the recipient) of a message anonymous. The anonymity set is defined as the set of 
all potential senders (recipients) of the message. Anonymity is defined as being not identifiable 
among a group of entities, i.e., the members of the anonymity set. A higher degree of 
anonymity is achieved with an anonymity set of larger size. Perfect anonymity is achieved if 
anonymity set contains all the members capable of sending (receiving) messages in system. 
3. System model 
In this section, we describe the various actors/components of our system. There are three 
major actors - Issuer, Tag and Reader- in our system. We also describe some key concepts that 
will be used throughout the rest of the paper like Group, Group Key, Tag secret key, Identifiers 
and System parameters. All these form the system model for AnonPri protocol. 
Our protocol is based on the group-based scheme. In our system, tags are divided into groups 
of equal size. Suppose, N is the total number of tags in the system and τ is the number of 
groups. So, the group size is 𝑛𝑛 = 𝑁𝑁
𝜏𝜏
 . In this section, we define the components and parameters 
of our system. 
Issuer. The issuer initializes each tag during the deployment by writing the tag's information 
into its memory. The issuer also authorizes the reader access to the tags. Even each group 
receives its unique group key and a pool of identifiers from the issuer. 
Group. Each group has a n number of tags. The issuer assigns a unique group key 𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  to the ith 
group Gi of the system. This key is shared between the members (tags) of this group. Each 
group also receives the following pool of identifiers from the issuer 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 =
�𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,1, 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,2, … , 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑀𝑀�, where, 1 ≤ i ≤ τ and M is a system parameter. The pools of any two 
groups do not share any identifier, i.e., 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 ∩ 𝜉𝜉𝑗𝑗 = ∅,∀𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗 . Each tag of the group Gi is assigned 
a couple of identifiers from ξi by the issuer. 
Tag. All the tags of the system are divided into τ groups. Each tag receives the shared group key 
of the group that the tag belongs to, a unique secret key that is known only to the reader and 
the tag itself, and a set of identifiers from the pool of identifiers of the group. Suppose, the tag 
Tj belongs to the group Gi. This tag possesses the group key 𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  , the unique secret key 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗, and 
a set of identifiers Ωij. Each key is of θ bits, where θ is the security parameter of symmetric key 
encryption. We define the Ωij as follows where,  
• each 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥  is chosen randomly following uniform distribution from the pool ξi and 𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥 ∈{1,2, … ,𝑀𝑀}, where 1 ≤ x ≤ m 
• 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥 ≠ 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑦𝑦  , for all x ≠ y 
• m is also a system parameter and M > m. 
• Here, M is a system parameter that refers to the number of identifiers assigned to a 
particular group. And m refers to the number of identifiers assigned to each tag. The 
more identifiers are assigned, that is the more the value of M, the harder it is for the 
adversary to break privacy. However, we cannot make M such a very large number so 
that the system becomes slow. There has to be a tradeoff between the two and system 
designer needs to make a decision of choosing M based on the requirement of system's 
performance and privacy need. 
To ensure that attacker cannot find out which identifier belongs to which tag, in our system we 
let identifiers to be shared between multiple tags within a group. By allowing a single identifier 
to be shared by multiple tags within a group, we make sure that attacker finds those tags 
unlinkable from each other, hence guaranteeing more privacy than traditional protocols. In our 
system, the identifiers are assigned to the tags in such a way that at least one identifier of a tag 
is shared with at least two other members of the same group. 
So, we can say for the tag Tj,  ∃𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞[𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥 ∈ (𝛺𝛺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∩ 𝛺𝛺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)], 
Where, p,q are any two members of Gi and p ≠ q. 
Reader. The reader is connected to the backend server. In this paper, we assume the 
communication channel between the reader and the backend server is secured. From now on, 
we denote the backend server as the reader. In our system, the tag is the prover and the reader 
is the verifier. The reader receives all the secret information by the issuer during the 
deployment. The issuer issues the reader a set of secret information for each group in the 
system 𝜓𝜓 = {𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ,𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖|1 ≤ 𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝜏𝜏}, where 𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  is the secret group key and σi is the mapping of the 
identifiers of the pool ξi with the secret keys of tags. Formally, 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 = {𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑥𝑥,𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥|1 ≤ 𝑥𝑥 ≤
𝑀𝑀 and 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖}, 
Where, πx is the set of secret keys of tags associated with the IDi, x. πx can be defined as an 
empty set if no tag is associated with the IDi, x or it can be a set of size at least one. Formally,  
𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥 = {{𝑘𝑘𝜔𝜔1 ,𝑘𝑘𝜔𝜔2 , … }, 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝜔𝜔∗ ∈ {𝑇𝑇1,𝑇𝑇2, … ,𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁}∅, 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒. 
System parameters. Since each tag receives m identifiers randomly chosen from the pool of M 
identifiers, according to the ID distribution strategy, we can say that each tag has at least one 
identifier common with at least two group members. The probability that each tag shares at 
least one identifier with at least two group members is  
𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎 = 1 − ((𝑀𝑀 −𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 )(𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚
) × (𝑀𝑀 − 2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 )(𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚
) ) = 1 − ((𝑀𝑀−𝑚𝑚)!)3(𝑀𝑀!)2(𝑀𝑀− 3𝑚𝑚)! 
Where, M ≥ nm. For example, we consider an RFID system of 1000 tags divided in 10 groups. 
100 tags are in each group. For simplicity, we assume M = 1000 and m = 10. Then the 
probability that each tag shares at least one identifier with at least two group members is 
𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎 = 96.87%. 
4. Our protocol: AnonPri 
In this section, we describe our protocol. In our protocol, in order to authenticate a tag, the 
reader sends a single challenge to the tag. The answer of the tag has two parts. In the first part, 
the tag answers to the reader by encrypting with the group key the reader's challenge 
concatenated with a nonce picked by the tag, and the tag's identifier (chosen from the pool of 
IDs). In the second part, the tag encrypts the challenge concatenated with the nonce using its 
own secret key. Encrypting the identifier is needed since the key used for encryption does not 
identify uniquely the tag. Upon reception of the answer, the reader identifies the tag by trying 
all the group keys until the decryption succeeds. Once the reader finds out the tag ID, then it 
checks the second part. The reader tries all secret keys associated with the identifier to decrypt 
the second part of the message. Without the second part, every tag could impersonate every 
other tag in the same group. Fig. 3 illustrates the two party message communications in 
AnonPri. 
 Fig. 3. The anonymous private authentication protocol (AnonPri). 
The reader starts to query the tag with a nonce nr. Upon the reception of the query, the tag 
generates another nonce nt. Suppose the reader interrogates the tag Tj. In the second step, the 
tag picks an identifier, say 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥, from Ωij. Then the tag computes β as shown in Fig. 3. Here, 
Ek(.) denotes symmetric key encryption with key k. The tag replies with the β. Now the reader 
searches all the group keys until it finds the correct one that properly decrypts the first part (u) 
of the response. If the reader retrieves the identifier 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥  that the tag used in its response, 
then the reader tries to decrypt the second part (v) of β with the potential set of secret keys (πx) 
associated with 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥. After finding the right secret key, the reader can uniquely identify the tag 
Tj. Sharing some identifiers of a tag with other members of the group provide unlinkability even 
if any tag is compromised by the adversary. We discuss this in section VII. 
5. Attack model 
In this section and the following section, we discuss how AnonPri guarantees the privacy and 
security of an RFID system. We first define the attack model in our system. Then we define the 
two key concept, privacy and unlinkibility, from the perspective of AnonPri and finally we 
demonstrate the ability of AnonPri in defending against physical attacks, which in turn ensures 
more privacy and guarantees unlinkibility. 
One of the major goals of an adversary in any RFID system is to infringe the tags’ privacy by 
means of tracking. Our attack model (shown in Fig. 4) allows the adversary to eavesdrop on the 
communication between tags and the reader, and also to communicate directly with the tag 
and the reader, but not to modify messages that are sent between them. In other words, we 
consider an active adversary, but explicitly disregard man-in-the-middle attacks. In this paper, 
an adversary is denoted as ?̂?𝐴 . We assume ?̂?𝐴 as an active adversary who has full control over all 
the communications between the tag and the reader. She can not only eavesdrop, but also 
intercept, modify and even initiate authentication session. The adversary can, for example, 
impersonate a tag and communicate with the valid reader. Even the adversary can query a valid 
tag and learn the tag's response. Our assumptions also include that the adversary can control a 
number of readers and tags. Each reader and tag controlled by the adversary are denoted as 
𝑅𝑅� and 𝑇𝑇� , respectively. 𝑅𝑅�  is unauthorized to have access to any real tags since 𝑅𝑅�  has no secret 
information like the real reader R. Similarly, 𝑇𝑇�  is not valid as it does not have the secret and 
identifying information of a valid tag. However, the adversarial reader 𝑅𝑅�  can communicate with 
a valid tag. Even the fake tag 𝑇𝑇�  can communicate with a legitimate reader. In both cases, the 
ultimate goal of the adversary is to track any tag of the system. Fig. 4 illustrates the attack 
model in our system: 
 
Fig. 4. Attack model in our system. 
We assume that the adversary, the adversarial reader, and the adversarial tag have 
polynomially bounded resources. In addition, the adversary can launch physical attacks. 
However, the hardware-based defenses against physical attacks are beyond the scope of this 
paper. We also assume that the reader cannot be compromised. 
6. Privacy model 
In this section, we explain and theoretically define how AnonPri provides privacy and 
guarantees unlinkibility. At the end of the protocol description, we mention that this protocol 
provide unlinkability and thereby preserves privacy. The adversary cannot link the responses 
with the tags, even if she can decrypt the first portion of the response and learn the identifier 
that the tags are using to produce the response. Like Juels and Weis,16 we use an experiment-
based definition to formalize RFID privacy. We conclude that the adversary cannot break 
unlinkability or invade privacy with probability better than random guessing. In our system, the 
following oracle-like construction exists: 
𝒪𝒪𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘  is an oracle that randomly chooses some tags from all the N tags of the system. 
𝒪𝒪𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  takes a tag T as an input. Given the nonce nr, the group key kG, the secret key kT and 
the set of identifiers Ω, the oracle randomly selects an ID ∈ Ω, generates another nonce and 
finally produces the response 𝛽𝛽 = (𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣). It outputs the cipher text β. 
𝒪𝒪𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒  is an oracle that, provided with a tag T, queries the tag and outputs the received 
response β. 
𝒪𝒪𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is an oracle that, provided with two tags T0, T1, randomly chooses b ∈ {0, 1} and queries 
the tag Tb using 𝒪𝒪𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 . Then it outputs the response βb. 
 
6.1. Information privacy against  
Given a tag T, the set of identifiers Ω stored on T, and an identifier ID, an adversary can break 
the information privacy of our protocol if she can guess whether the tag T is using the ID. 
Moreover, θ is the security parameter and 𝑜𝑜 ∈ ℕ is the maximum number of time the adversary 
can query the tag T. In addition, since the oracles of our model are random, the inputs are 
computationally intractable from the outputs of the oracles. 
Experiment Exp𝐴𝐴�𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝[𝜃𝜃, 𝑜𝑜] 
1. Setup: The issuer initializes the N tags of the system with their corresponding unique 
secret keys, the group keys, and the sets of identifiers after dividing the tags into τ 
groups. It shares all the secret information with only the reader. 
2. Learning: 𝒪𝒪𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 provides the adversary with a challenged tag T that the adversary 
queries t times and appends each response β to the list L (initially L is an empty list). 
3. Guess: Now the adversary transmits the tag T to the oracle 𝒪𝒪𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 with a nonce and 
receives a response β from the oracle. The adversary selects an identifier ID. Given the 
list of t responses in L, ?̂?𝐴  outputs 1 if she guesses that β is produced using ID, and 0 
otherwise. ?̂?𝐴 is successful if her guess is right. 
Definition 1 
AnonPri is said to preserve information privacy with security parameter θ and poly(θ) 
representing any polynomial function of θ, if ∀?̂?𝐴, Pr[Exp𝐴𝐴�𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝[𝜃𝜃, 𝑜𝑜]succeeds] ≤ 12 + 1𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒(𝜃𝜃). 
6.2. Unlinkability against  
The adversary should not be able to distinguish between the two responses from the same tag. 
Experiment Exp𝐴𝐴�𝑞𝑞𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘[𝜃𝜃, 𝑜𝑜] 
1. Setup: The issuer initializes the N tags of the system with their corresponding unique 
secret keys, the group keys, and the sets of identifiers after dividing the tags into τ 
groups. It shares all the secret information with only the reader. 
2. Learning: 𝒪𝒪𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 provides the adversary with two challenged tags T0, T1 from the same 
group. The adversary queries each tag t times and appends each response β0, β1 to the 
list L (initially L is an empty list). 
3. Guess: The adversary transmits T0, T1 to the oracle 𝒪𝒪𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . receives the response βb from 
𝒪𝒪𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. Given the list of responses L and the response βb, the adversary guesses the value 
of b. ?̂?𝐴 succeeds if her guess is right. 
Definition 2 
AnonPri is said to provide unlinkability with security parameter θ and poly(θ) representing any 
polynomial function of θ, if ∀?̂?𝐴, Pr[Exp𝐴𝐴�𝑞𝑞𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘[𝜃𝜃, 𝑜𝑜]succeeds] ≤ 12 + 1𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒(𝜃𝜃). 
In our system, the adversary has no better way other than guessing to become successful in 
distinguishing the tags. Hence, the probability of getting successful in distinguishing the tags is 
less than or equal to 1/2. For example, let say, the adversary sends the oracle 2 inputs - m0 and 
m1. Oracle will choose one of them randomly and compute an output (Out0) and send it back to 
the adversary. Note, here is the oracle works as a blackbox. Now, the adversary has no 
information other than m0, m1 and Out0. If the adversary can now successfully find out Out0 
belongs to which input, she is able to break system's privacy. However, since the adversary has 
no other information, its best bet is to choose one of the input randomly with probability 1/2. If 
the input chosen is really the input corresponding to Out0, then adversary breaks the privacy of 
the system, in other words the adversary is able to distinguish/link the tags with probability 
1/2. 
7. Security and privacy analysis 
In this section, we formally prove that our protocol preserves data privacy and provides 
unlinkability. In addition, we analyze the preservation of privacy in some attack scenarios where 
some of the tags of the system are compromised by the adversary ?̂?𝐴 . We begin the section 
with the formal theorem on how AnonPri preserves privacy and provides unlinkibility. We also 
formally prove them in this section. 
7.1. Information privacy 
Theorem 1 
AnonPri preserves information privacy with respect to the adversary 𝐴𝐴�. 
Proof 
Let us assume 𝒪𝒪𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 provides the adversary ?̂?𝐴 with a tag T. ?̂?𝐴 transmits this tag to the oracle 
𝒪𝒪𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 with a nonce n1. Then 𝒪𝒪𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 provides ?̂?𝐴 with the response β. 
Now, ?̂?𝐴 selects a ID. To break data privacy, ?̂?𝐴 should tell if β is produced using the ID. This 
implies that ?̂?𝐴 has to identify the input of the encryption by just learning the cipher text. ?̂?𝐴 can 
succeed in two cases. First, if she can retrieve the inputs from the output of the random oracle. 
But this contradicts with our assumption that the inputs of a random oracle are 
computationally intractable from the output of the oracle. Second, if ?̂?𝐴 knows the secret keys of 
the tag T. Without tampering the tag T, if ?̂?𝐴 can determine the keys by learning the cipher texts, 
this again breaks the semantic security of the symmetric key cryptography. Therefore ?̂?𝐴 can 
break data privacy with probability no better than random guessing. Thus, it proves data 
privacy property of Definition 1.  
7.2. Unlinkability 
Theorem 2 
AnonPri provides unlinkability with respect to the adversary ?̂?𝐴. 
Proof 
Let us assume 𝒪𝒪𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 provides the adversary ?̂?𝐴 with two tags T0, T1 from the same group. These 
two tags go into the learning phase. ?̂?𝐴 transmits T0, T1 to 𝒪𝒪𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 which outputs the response βb. 
Now, to break unlinkability, the adversary ?̂?𝐴 has to tell the value of b. We assume that the 
adversary's guess is right. In other words, the adversary can determine whether the response βb 
is produced by T0 or T1, given the learned responses from both the tags. The responses of a tag 
cannot be a signature of the tag because according to our protocol, a nonce on the tag side 
makes each response different from all the previous responses originated from the same tag. 
Therefore, we can say that the guess is right because the adversary knows the keys (the group 
key and the secret key) stored on these two tags. Without tampering the tags T0, T1, the 
adversary has to determine the keys stored on these tags by just observing the cipher texts. But 
this contradicts with the semantic security of symmetric key cryptography. Therefore, the 
adversary can break unlinkability with no better approach than random guessing. Thus, it 
proves the unlinkability property of Definition 2.  
7.3. Physical attack 
Under this attack (shown in Fig. 5), we consider that the adversary ?̂?𝐴 can compromise any tag 
with a probability of 1
𝑁𝑁
. Whenever a tag Tj becomes compromised, the adversary learns all 
private information stored on the tag Tj. Therefore, the adversary can now decrypt u of each 
response β originated from the other members of the group Gi. Thus, ?̂?𝐴 can learn the identifier 
that a tag is using to produce its response by decrypting the u. We discuss the aftereffect of this 
attack with an example and demonstrate how AnonPri provides unlinkability even if the 
adversary realizes the identifiers used in the responses. 
 
Fig. 5. After effect of a physical attack on AnonPri, where T3 is compromised by the adversary. 
We consider a group Gi of four tags T1, T2, T3, and T4. Suppose the adversary compromised the 
tag T3 as shown in Fig. 4. Now the adversary learns the group key 𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  , the tag secret key 
𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇3  and a set of identifiers 𝛺𝛺3 = {1,2,3,4}. From now on, the adversary can decrypt u part of all 
the responses originated from T1, T2, and T4 with the group key 𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖. But, the adversary still 
cannot decrypt v part of these responses since she does not possess the secret keys of these 
tags. With this learned information (𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  and Ω3), the adversary tries to track the other tags of 
this group. Since the adversary can decrypt u of each responses, she can learn the identifier 
underlying the cipher text u. In other words, she can discover which identifier has been used to 
produce a response. The arrow in the Fig. 4 represents that the responses of the authentication 
sessions (after T3 is compromised) are transmitted from the tags (T1, T2, T4) to the reader. The 
identifiers used in these responses are shown on above the arrow. Each identifier is shown in 
plaintext since the adversary can retrieve the identifier by decrypting u of β using 𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖. 
According to our protocol, even if the adversary comes to know about the identifier used in a 
response, she cannot conclude which of the potential tags is the sender of this response. In our 
example, the adversary discovers the identifier 2 is used two times, but she cannot be certain 
which of these tags (T1, T2, T4) is the originator(s) of these responses. Though T3 shares the 
identifier 2 with only T1 and T4, however, the adversary has no knowledge about the parties 
with whom T3 is sharing which of its identifiers. Even the adversary does not know how many of 
the identifiers of Ω3 are being shared. So, under this scenario, the anonymity set of the 
potential senders of a given response seems to be 3 to the adversary. Therefore, when the 
adversary compromises one tag from the group of n uncorrupted tags, AnonPri forms an 
anonymity set of size 1 and another anonymity set of size (𝑛𝑛 − 1) from the group instead of n 
anonymity sets of size 1 like the group based authentication.3 This noticeable partition 
improves the level of privacy provided by AnonPri. Because, the remaining (𝑁𝑁 − 𝑛𝑛) tags of the 
system forms the other anonymity set which is same under both the protocols. Thus AnonPri 
prevents adversary benefit from tracking by compromising a tag. 
We now consider the case of compromising multiple tags of the same group. In the above 
scenario, even if ?̂?𝐴 compromises either T1 or T4 after compromising T3, the adversary cannot be 
certain whether T2 has identifier 2 in Ω2 or not. Therefore, the size of anonymity set is still 2, 
i.e., , where c is the number of compromised tags of the group. If ?̂?𝐴 compromises T2 instead of 
T1 or T4, the size of anonymity set is still 2 (i.e., 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑐𝑐). Therefore, we conclude that the 
anonymity set, formed from a group that is under physical attack, is of size (𝑛𝑛 − 𝑐𝑐), where n is 
the group size and c is the number of compromised tags of the given group. AnonPri provides 
protocol-level privacy only. In real world, there are many possible side channels. If tags emit 
distinct “radio-fingerprint”, then no protocol-level privacy countermeasures can prevent 
privacy infringement.1 
8. Measurement of privacy 
In this section, we measure the level of privacy achieved by AnonPri as a function of the total 
number of compromised tags. We consider two privacy metrics for the measurement of 
privacy. First, our privacy measurement technique is based on anonymity set like the privacy 
metric used by Avoine et al.3 and we name this metric "privacy level". Second, we identify the 
amount of information disclosed by a scheme as another metric presented in.25 This metric is 
based on Shannon's information theorem33 and we name this metric “information leakage”. 
From the perspective of AnonPri, these two are the most important metric since the main 
purpose of AnonPri is to provide privacy and ensure unlinkibility. Hence we choose these two 
metric for our experiment. 
8.1. Measurement of privacy based on anonymity set 
The level of privacy of an RFID system, achieved by a scheme, at a given time, is a function of 
the total number of compromised tags at that time. When some tags are compromised, the set 
of all tags are partitioned such that the adversary cannot distinguish the tags belong to the 
same partition, but she can distinguish the tags that belong to different partitions. Hence, these 
partitions become the anonymity sets of their members. The level of privacy based on 












Where, |Pi| denotes the size of partition Pi and 
|𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖||𝑁𝑁|  is the probability that a randomly chosen tag 
belongs to partition Pi. 
According to AnonPri, a similar kind of partitions is formed when tags become compromised. If 
ci is the number of compromised tags within group Gi, then the set of the tags within this group 
is partitioned into ci anonymity sets of size 1 and another anonymity set of size (𝑛𝑛 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖). If ℂ ={𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖|𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖is the total compromised tags with in 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖} is the set of compromised groups, |ℂ| is the 
total number of compromised groups, and 𝐶𝐶 = ∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∈ℂ  is the total number of 
compromised tags, the level of privacy ℘ achieved by AnonPri can be expressed as  
℘ = 1
𝑁𝑁2
((𝑛𝑛(𝜏𝜏 − |ℂ|))2 + � (𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + (𝑛𝑛 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖)2)
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∈ℂ
) 
Where, N = total number of tags in the system 
n = total number of tags within a group 
τ = total number of groups in the system. 
8.2. Measurement of privacy based on information leakage 
We measure the information leakage in bits based on Shannon's information theorem.33 If we 
have a group of tags of size S and the adversary divides this group into two disjoint subgroups 
of size S/2, then 1 bit of information is disclosed out of log2S bits. Extending this concept from 
two subgroups of equal size to two subgroups of different sizes, where 𝑆𝑆
𝑎𝑎
 tags are in one 
subgroup and the remaining tags �1 − 1
𝑎𝑎
� 𝑆𝑆 are in another subgroup, we can measure the 
average amount of information disclosed in bits as follows  
𝐼𝐼 = 1
𝑎𝑎
log2(𝑎𝑎) + 𝑎𝑎 − 1𝑎𝑎 log2( 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 1). 
In general, if the adversary splits N tags of the system into k disjoint partitions, then  






Where, |Pi| denotes the size of partition Pi. 
According to our protocol, if ℂ = {𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖|𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖is the total compromised tags within 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖} is the set of 
compromised groups, |ℂ| is the total number of compromised groups, and 𝐶𝐶 = ∑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∈ℂ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 is 
the total number of compromised tags, the amount of information leakage in bits I can be 
expressed as  
𝐼𝐼 = (𝑛𝑛(𝜏𝜏 − |ℂ|)
𝑁𝑁
log2( 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛(𝜏𝜏 − |ℂ|))) + � (𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(1𝑁𝑁 log2𝑁𝑁) + (𝑛𝑛 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖)𝑁𝑁 log2( 𝑁𝑁(𝑛𝑛 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖)))
each𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∈ℂ
 
where, N = total number of tags in the system 
n = total number of tags within a group 
τ = total number of groups in the system. 
8.3. Experimental results 
We have compared both the protocols, AnonPri and the group based authentication, using a 
Matlab simulation. The experiment results establish that the level of privacy provided by 
AnonPri is higher than that of the group based authentication. Our comparison is based on the 
two metrics presented above, the level of privacy (based on anonymity set) and information 
leakage. We have come up with a conclusion similar as25 that the information leakage describes 
the privacy threats better than the anonymity set. In our simulation, we have considered four 
systems with 𝑁𝑁 = 210, 𝜏𝜏 = 64, 𝑁𝑁 = 216, 𝜏𝜏 = 64,𝑁𝑁 = 220, 𝜏𝜏 = 64 and 𝑁𝑁 = 230, 𝜏𝜏 = 64. Tags 
are selected to be compromised with a uniform random distribution. The number of 
compromised tags ranges from 0 to 160. We have run the simulation for 100 times and 
computed the average ℘ achieved by AnonPri and the group based authentication as a function 
of the total number of compromised tags C (see Fig. 6(a), (c), (e), and (g)). The small increase in 
the level of privacy achieved by AnonPri is visible when the number of compromised tags is 
more than 30. 
 Fig. 6. Comparison of AnonPri with the group based authentication. 
During the simulation, we have also computed the average amount of information leakage I, for 
both the protocols, as a function of the total number of compromised tags C (see Fig. 6(b), (d), 
(f), and (h)). The plots depict that AnonPri achieves a significant amount of improvement in 
privacy protection. With the increase in the total number of compromised tags C, the average 
amount of information disclosed by the group based authentication is quite higher than the 
information disclosed by AnonPri. In Fig. 6(d) (𝑁𝑁 = 216), when C becomes 160, the group based 
authentication discloses about 15 bits out of 16 bits of information, while AnonPri discloses 
about 6 bits of information. 
The group based authentication discloses 56.25% more information than AnonPri in a similar 
setup. Fig. 6(f) (𝑁𝑁 = 220) shows that the group based authentication reveals almost 19 bits out 
of 20 bits of information and AnonPri reveals around 6 bits of information. This time the group 
based authentication discloses 65% more information than AnonPri. Based on the simulation 
results, we can conclude that the information disclosed by the group based authentication 
increases with the size of the system (as it is also seen in Fig. 6(h)); however, AnonPri shows 
consistency in the information leakage in both the cases. 
Information leakage is a better metric to demonstrate the privacy threats in RFID systems than 
anonymity set. Though the improvement in ℘ provided by AnonPri against the group based 
authentication is not significant, however, we can say that AnonPri provides better privacy 
protection than the group based authentication, based on the results of the amount of 
information disclosed by these two protocols. 
9. Discussion 
In this section, we discuss the limitations of AnonPri. 
9.1. Search complexity 
According to AnonPri, the reader's complexity is slightly increased than the group based 
scheme.8 After receiving the response 𝛽𝛽 = (𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣)from a tag Tj, the reader searches for the 
correct group key to decrypt u. In the worst case, the reader has to perform this operation τ 
times. If such a group key exists, the reader can retrieve the identifier 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥  from u. Now, the 
reader has to search for the tag's secret key to identify Tj by decrypting v properly. The reader 
searches a key space of size |πx|. Therefore, in the worst case, the reader's total complexity is 
𝜏𝜏 + |𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥|. In the best case, the size of πx is 3 and in the worst case, it can be n, size of the group. 
But in the group based scheme, the reader's complexity in worst case is 𝜏𝜏 + 1. Nevertheless, 
AnonPri is much better than the other schemes where the worst case reader's complexity is N, 
the number of total tags in the system. To provide improvement in privacy protection, we have 
to sacrifice this small increase in the complexity of the reader. Since readers are more powerful 
than tags, they can handle this increase in search complexity. 
9.2. Memory complexity 
According to AnonPri, tags need to store m number of identifiers along with the group key and 
the unique secret key. Though tags have limited resources, however, the increase in memory 
requirement is acceptable than the increase in computation and communication complexity. A 
smart RFID tags have memory capacity of 32 kBytes or more.17 Even RFID tags with extended 
memory capacity are available at the market.10 All these tags can store the information 
required for AnonPri. 
10. Related work 
Many private authentication techniques have been proposed to protect user privacy for RFID 
systems. Some of these schemes require the reader to test O(N) keys to authenticate a tag, 
where N is the total number of tags in the system. Such a complexity is unmanageable in a 
large-scale environment. These techniques can be classified into two categories, non-tree-
based approaches and tree-based approaches. Non-tree-based protocols usually perform linear 
search to find out a tag. The search complexity is O(N), where N is the number of tags. 
Obviously, the linear search is not efficient in large-scale RFID systems that may have millions of 
tags.30 
Another non-tree-based approach, Hash-lock36 method uses the hash value of a key to identify 
a tag. A variation of Hash-lock needs exhaustive search through all IDs to identify a tag. 
However, hash-chain, researchers further reduced the search complexity to O(N2/3).9 This 
approach suffers from de-synchronization attacks. Dimitriou's protocol9 defends against the de-
synchronization attack though it is not secure against tracking attack. Henrici et al.11 propose 
the triggered hash chains approach that alters the tag ID after each successful authentication. 
The main drawback of the non-tree-based approaches is the low search efficiency. To address 
the issue, tree-based protocols are proposed. Molnar and Wagner proposed an approach in20 
that reduces the complexity of authentication from O(N) to O(logN). This reduction is made 
possible by using a key-tree instead of a flat key space. However, this key-tree based private 
authentication scheme reduces the complexity of the authentication for the reader, there is a 
price to be paid for this gain in performance. The level of privacy provided by the scheme is 
quickly decreasing as more and more tags are compromised. Numbers of research have been 
conducted to find out a trade-off between the complexity and the level of privacy provided by 
the key-tree based scheme. This trade-off is identified and analyzed by Avoine et al. in.2 by 
Buttyan, Holczer, and Vajda in,4 and more recently by Nohl and Evans in.25 These papers 
introduce privacy metrics and quantify the level of privacy provided by the key-tree based 
scheme when some tags are compromised. In addition, in,4 the authors observe that key-trees 
that have different branching factors at different levels of the tree can provide a higher level of 
privacy, and they propose an algorithm to determine the optimal key-tree for a given number 
of tags and a given upper bound on the complexity of the authentication. 
Avoine et al. proposed a group based private authentication scheme in3 (later improved by 
Hoque el.al14) that improves the tradeoff between scalability and privacy by dividing the tags 
into a number of groups. One major limitation of this protocol is that the level of privacy 
provided by the scheme decreases as more and more tags are compromised. Lu et al. propose a 
RFID private authentication protocol (SPA).18 which enables a dynamic key-updating for tree-
based authentication approaches. Molnar et al. propose a new method21 that supports 
delegation in the tag authentication. The tag owner can transfer the ownership to another 
party for authenticating valid tags. Similarly, the authors in35 propose a server-free 
authentication protocol. It does not need backend server or database. However, this approach 
does not provide an efficient key searching mechanism for the backend application. 
The authors in24 discuss the unlinkability and the real world constraints in RFID systems. They 
define a link expression with real world constraints and propose a location-tracking model. The 
simulation results show the real world constraints have possibility that break the unlinkability. 
However, the authors did not consider the unlinkability issue from privacy violation 
perspective. 
A lightweight RFID private authentication protocol, RWP, have been proposed in,37 based on 
the random walk concept. The analysis results show that RWP effectively enhances the security 
protection for RFID private authentication, and increases the authentication efficiency from 
O(logN) to O(1). However, this technique is suitable for tags with high computational power as 
the technique requires tags to perform randomized hash functions. 
Another authentication technique proposed by Zhou in40 focuses on utilizing fewer resources 
on the tags for authentication. However, even though they we able to achieve more security 
and efficiency, their proposed approach did not focus on providing privacy for the users. HB-
family protocols based on LPN assumption are also booming as one of the attractive candidates 
for secure low cost protocols based on EPC tags due to its security against quantum 
adversaries, efficient computational time and memory requirement etc. However, their focus 
was design a secure authentication protocol to meet the demand of low-cost tags. 
In,38 the authors proposed a protocol that enables the private identification of tags in the 
system with constant-time complexity based quadratic residue, and thereby addresses the 
problem of individual tag identification in large-scale RFID systems. However, the protocol is 
based on timestamp and hence unlinkibility cannot be ensured. 
In the recent past, significant research has been conducted in developing RFID systems to ease 
the everyday life of human.13,39,22,19, and 15 Even recently some research has been performed to 
devise accurate ways of determining indoor location.32,23 But all of these researches mainly 
focused on developing the system itself, rather than focusing to consider the privacy impacts of 
installing those RFID systems in practical environment. In.34 Sun et al. have presented methods 
to perform large scale authentication and combat attacks. 
They proposed RSLA which provides both high authentication efficiency and a high privacy 
protection mechanism. RSLA relies on skip lists, a different data structure from the existing 
solutions. However, this protocol is not suitable to be deployed in low-cost tags. Sakai et. al. 
propose a novel distributed RFID architecture in.31 In addition, they proposed a coding scheme, 
which when incorporated with the new architecture, works against a wide range of adversaries 
including the random guessing attack, correlation attack, ghost-and leech attack, and 
eavesdropping. However, this protocol even strongly secure, does not discuss much about how 
to preserve privacy or guarantee unlinkibility. Chen et. al. proposed an anonymous 
authentication protocol based on asymmetry principle for RFID systems.7 The protocol reduces 
the communication overhead and online computation overhead for both the tags and the 
readers, which compares favorably with the prior art. 
Table 1 summarizes the capabilities of the existing works discussed in this section, where N is 
the number of tags in the system. 
Table 1. Comparison of existing techniques. 
Reference Complexity Cloning resistance Tracking resistance Privacy protection 
[26] O(N) Yes Yes Yes 
[36] O(1) No No No 
[20] O(logN) Yes No Yes 
[3] 1O(γ) Yes Yes Yes 
[2] O(N2/3) Yes No Yes 
[9] O(logN) Yes No Yes 
[11] O(1) No No Yes 
[21] O(logN) No No Yes 
[35] O(N) Yes Yes Yes 
Our Protocol 2O(𝜏𝜏 + |𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥|) Yes Yes Yes      
1. γ is the number of groups in the system. 
2. In the best case, the size of πx is 3 and in the worst case, it can be n, size of the group. 
11. Conclusions 
RFID systems can be useful for many applications if the system can guarantee consumer privacy 
as well as improve scalability. To address the tradeoff between privacy and scalability, we have 
proposed an anonymous private authentication protocol (AnonPri) in this paper. We have 
presented a brief comparison between the tree based hash protocol and the group based 
authentication protocol for RFID systems. A detail security and privacy analysis of AnonPri 
establishes that AnonPri preserves information privacy as well as unlinkability. In addition, 
AnonPri provides higher level of privacy than the group based scheme when the adversary 
compromises some of the tags. Even though the search complexity of AnonPri is little higher 
than the existing protocols, it is much better than performing linear search in the database to 
identify a single tag. Finally, we can say that AnonPri is suitable for many applications where 
privacy violation is a major point-of-failure. Our future work includes further reducing the costs 
of complexity, storage, increasing scalability. Another future work can be to determine an 
optimal tradeoff between the authentication complexity and storage required. 
References 
1G. Avoine, P. Oechslin A scalable and provably secure hash based RFID protocol Proceedings 
of the IEEE International Workshop on Pervasive Computing and Communication 
Security (PerSec 2005). USA (2005), pp. 110-114 
2G. Avoine, E. Dysli, P. Oechslin Reducing time complexity in RFID systems B. Preneel, S. 
Tavares (Eds.), Selected Areas in Cryptography, LNCS 3897, Springer (2005), pp. 291-306 
3G. Avoine, L. Buttyan, T. Holczer, I. Vajda Group-based private authentication Proceedings of 
the World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM 2007). Finland 
(2007), pp. 1-6 
4L. Buttyan, T. Holczer, I. Vajda Optimal key-trees for tree-based private authentication 
Proceedings of the Privacy Enhancing Technologies Workshop (PET 2006), Springer 
(2006), pp. 332-350 
5CASPIAN Press Release. Metro's decision to drop the loyalty card, 2004. Last accessed July 26, 
2010 - http://www.spychips.com/metro/press-release-feb-27.html 
6C. Chatmon, T. v. Le, M. Burmester Secure anonymous RFID authentication protocols 
http://www.cs.fsu.edu/∼burmeste/TR-060112.pdf (2006) 
7M. Chen, S. Chen An efficient anonymous authentication protocol for RFID systems using 
dynamic tokens Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Distributed 
Computing Systems (ICDCS). OH (2015), pp. 756-757 
8C. Diaz, S. Seys, J. Claessens, B. Preneel Towards measuring anonymity Proceedings of the 
Privacy Enhancing Technologies Workshop (PET 2002). USA. (2002), pp. 54-68 
9T. Dimitriou A lightweight RFID protocol to protect against traceability and cloning attacks 
Proceedings of the EAI International Conference on Security and Privacy in 
Communication Networks (SecureComm 05) (2005), pp. 59-66 
10Fujitsu Report. Fujitsu develops world's first 64KByte high-capacity FRAM RFID tag for aviation 
applications, 2008. Last accessed June 2010. 
http://www.fujitsu.com/global/news/pr/archives/month/2008/20080109-01.html 
11D. Henrici, P. Müller Providing security and privacy in RFID systems using triggered hash 
chains Proceedings of the IEEE Intentional Conference on Pervasive Computing and 
Communication (PerCom 08) (2008), pp. 50-59 
12L. Hildner.Defusing the threat of RFID: protecting consumer privacy through technology-
specific legislation at the state level Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, 41 
(2006), pp. 133-176 
13S. Hinske Determining the position and orientation of multi-tagged objects using RFID 
technology Proceedings of the Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops 
(PerCom Workshops 2007). (2007), pp. 377-381 
14M.E. Hoque, F. Rahman, S.I. Ahamed AnonPri: an efficient anonymous private authentication 
protocol Proceedings of the IEEE Intentional Conference on Pervasive Computing and 
Communication (PerCom 2011) (2011), pp. 102-110 
15A. Ilic, F. Michahelles, E. Fleisch Dual ownership: access management for shared item 
information in RFID-enabled supply chains Proceedings of the Pervasive Computing and 
Communications Workshops (PerCom Workshops 2007) (2007), pp. 337-341 
16A. Juels, S. Weis Defining strong privacy for RFID Proceedings of the Pervasive Computing and 
Communications Workshops (PerComW 2007), USA (2007), pp. 342-347 
17A. Laurie Practical attacks against RFID Netw. Secur. , 2007 (9) (2007), pp. 4-7 
18 L. Lu, J. Han, L. Hu, Y. Liu, L.M. Ni Dynamic key-updating: privacy-preserving authentication 
for RFID systems Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Pervasive 
Computing and Communications (PerCom 07) (2007), pp. 13-22 
19M.S.I. Mamun, A. Miyaji A privacy-preserving efficient RFID authentication protocol from 
SLPN assumption Int. J. Comput. Sci. Eng. (IJCSE), Inderscience Publishers, 9 (2014), pp. 
234-243 
20D. Molnar, D. Wagner Privacy and security in library RFID: Issues, practices, and 
architectures Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications 
Security (CCS 04). USA (2004), pp. 210-219 
21D. Molnar, A. Soppera, D. Wagner A scalable, delegatable pseudonym protocol enabling 
owner-ship transfer of RFID Tags Proceedings of the ACM SIGAPP Symposium On 
Applied Computing (SAC 05) (2005), pp. 276-290 
22V.P. Munishwar, S. Singh, C. Mitchell, W. Xiaoshuang, K. Gopalan, N.B. Abu-Ghazaleh RFID 
based localization for a miniaturized robotic platform for wireless protocols evaluation 
Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and 
Communications (PerCom 2009) (2009), pp. 1-3 
23L.M. Ni, L. Yunhao, C.L. Yiu, A.P. Patil LANDMARC: indoor location sensing using active RFID 
Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and 
Communications (PerCom 2003). (2003), pp. 407-415 
24Y. Nohara, S. Inoue, H. Yasuura Unlinkability and real world constraints in RFID systems 
Proceedings of of Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshop (PerCom 
Workshops 2007) (2007), pp. 371-376 
25K. Nohl, D. Evans Quantifying information leakage in tree-based hash protocols Proceedings 
of Information and Communications Security (ICICS 2006). USA. (2006), pp. 228-237 
26M. Ohkubo, K. Suzuki, S. Kinoshita Cryptographic approach to privacy friendly tags 
Proceedings of RFID Privacy Workshop,, MA, USA, MIT (2003) 
27Press Release: Invasion Of Privacy? RFID Tracking Kids On School Buses, URL: 
http://www.ibtimes.com/invasion-privacy-rfid-tracking-kids-school-buses-privacy-
advocates-concerned-attendance-management [Last accessed: 3/28/2016] 
28Press Release: RFID Tags - Smart Idea or Invasion of Privacy?, URL: 
http://www.streetdirectory.com/travel_guide/115640/technology/rfid_tags___smart_i
dea_or_invasion_of_privacy.html [Last accessed: 3/28/2016] 
29F. Rahman, S.I. Ahamed, J.J. Yang, Q. Wang I am not a goldfish in a bowl: a privacy preserving 
framework for RFID based healthcare systems Proceedings of IEEE International Conf. 
e-Health Networking, Applications and Services (Healthcom 12). (2012), pp. 335-340 
30G. Roussos, V. Kostakos RFID in pervasive computing: ctate-of-the-art and outlook Pervasive 
and Mobile Comp., Elsevier (2008) 
31K. Sakai, M.T. Sun, W.S. Ku, T.H. Lai A novel coding scheme for secure communications in 
distributed RFID systems IEEE Trans. Comp. , 65 (February (2)) (2016), pp. 409-421 
32A. Saxena, S. Ganguly, S. Bhatnagar, R. Izmailov RFInD: an RFID-based system to manage 
virtual spaces Proceedings of Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops 
(PerCom Workshops 2007) (2007), pp. 382-387 
33C. Shannon A mathematical theory of communication Bell Syst. Tech. J., 27 (1948), pp. 379-
423 and 623-656 
34M.T. Sun; K. Sakai; W.S. Ku; T. Lai; A. Vasilakos, ``Private and secure tag access for large-scale 
RFID systems'' In IEEE Transactions on. Dependable and Secure Computing., vol.PP, 
no.99, pp.1–1  
35C. Tan, B. Sheng, Q. Li Serverless search and authentication protocols for RFID Proceedings of 
IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communication (PerCom 07) 
(2007), pp. 3-12 
36S. Weis, S. Sarma, R. Rivest, D. Engels Security and privacy aspects of low-cost radio 
frequency identification systems Proceedings of Security in Pervasive Computing (SPC 
2003), 2802, Germany, Springer-Verlag (2003), pp. 454-469 
37Q. Yao, Y. Qi, J. Han, J. Zhao, X. Li, Y. Liu Randomizing RFID private authentication 
Proceedings of the Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshop (PerCom 
Workshops 2009) (2009), pp. 1-10 
38C. Yalin, J.S. Chou, H.M. Sun A novel mutual authentication scheme based on quadratic 
residues for RFID systems J. Comput. Netw., 52 (August 12) (2008), pp. 2373-2380 
DOI=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2008.04.016 
39G. Zecca, P. Couderc, M. Banatre, R. Beraldi Swarm robot synchronization using RFID tags 
Proceedings of Pervasive Computing and Communications (PerCom 2009) (2009), pp. 1-
4 
40J. Zhou A quadratic residue-based lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol with 
constant-time identification JCM, 10 (2) (2015), pp. 117-123. 
